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ABSTRACT
Not Invented Here (N. I. H.) has been used among technical
organizations as a shorthand to describe the attitude (often
spoken of as if it were a disease) of technical organizations
who resist adoption of an innovation proposed from a source
outside of the organization. This study is an attempt to understand
some reasons why N. I. H. exists, how it works and to develop
a hypothesis about how it may be overcome.
Several cases have been chosen from a series of interviews in
which examples were described of successful and unsuccessful
attempts by an engineering research center to introduce innovations
to manufacturing plants. Each case is analyzed by Lewin's
Force Field concept and a Force Field Diagram is constructed
for each. The forces of all the cases are summarized and what
appear to be the major characteristics of the successful and
unsuccessful cases are examined using the findings of various
writers who have explored resistance to change.
The major conclusion reached is that from the cases examined,
it appears that N. I. H. is to a large degree created by those
attempting to introduce an innovation. In every unsuccessful
case, the plant that was the "client" of the research center was
excluded from participation in establishing research on the
problem from which the innovation was developed or was excluded
from the research itself. Conversely, in the successful cases
the client played an active role throughout in several phases of
the innovation development, even if it was simply adapting the
innovation to his needs. At the conclusion of the case examination,
several methods are suggested for introducing innovations to
technical organizations, based on the findings from the cases.
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Title: Associate Professor of Management
May 5, 1967
Professor Edward N. Hartley
Secretary of the Faculty
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Dear Professor Hartley:
In accordance with the requirements for graduation,
I herewith submit a thesis entitled, "Receptivity to Innovation -
Overcoming N. I. H. "
Without the sympathetic cooperation of those interviewed,
this thesis could not have been written. Without their interest
and insight the cases described would be much less complete.
I wish to thank Professor Moore for his guidance and
to thank Professor Rubin for his suggestions of both methods
and sources at several steps during the investigation.
Sincerely,
Robert P. Cla ett
_fii~
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION ................
The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...
Purpose . . ... . . . . . . . . . ...
Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. BACKGROUND . ...............
Case Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
III.
The Concept of Force Field . . . . . . . . ..
THE CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Case I Coil Winder . . . . . . . .
Plant 1 . . . . . . .
Plant 2 . . . . . . .
Plant 3 . . . . . . .
Plant 4 . . . . . . .
Plant 5 . . . . . . .
Case II Capacitor Studies
Case III Inventory Control
Case IV Team Project .
L,
PAGE
......... 13
......... 18
......... 24
......... 26
......... 26
. . . . . . . . . 30
. . . . . . 38
. . . . . . . 43
jCHAPTER PAGE
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Force Field Analyses ............. 50
Negative Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Positive Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
The Champion versus the Inventor ...... 56
The Innovator Role .. ............ 58
Identification with the Present State ...... . 60
Group Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Findings . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 62
Suggestions for Further Research . . . . . . . . 63
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................ 64
-~---
FORCE FIELD DIAGRAMS
DIAGRAM
NUMBER PAGE
1 Coil Winder, Plant 1 ............. 17
2 Coil Winder, Plant 2 ............. 24
3 Coil Winder, Plant 3 ............. 25
4 Coil Winder, Plant 5 .............. 29
5 Capacitor Studies, Plant 6 . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6 Inventory Control, Plant 2 . .......... 42
7 Team Project . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . .. 49
m - - ' I I _ CHAP TER I
INTRODUCTION
The Problem
My experience as engineer and manager at an Engineering
Research Center led to this investigation. Over a period of years
I have observed the difficulties experienced by the Research
Center in having the manufacturing engineering organizations
"pick up and run" with new process developments originating at
the Center. From the view of the Research Center this reluctance
was of course a difficiency of the manufacturing locations. The
reluctance of various departments of an organization to fully
cooperate with other departments is familiar to most and I will
add that it has appeared to me that technical departments have a
particularly difficult time in cooperating with each other. It
was at the Company Product Laboratories that I first heard the
term, N. I. H. for Not Invented Here, used to describe the
reluctance of another technical department to use an innovation
created in the narrator's department.
The term N. I. H. expresses to many the sum of the
problem of resistance to change, to accept an "outside" innovation
L
and especially that authoritative resistance righteously thrust
up by an "expert" when presented with a new idea in his field.
The problem and the reactions are not confined to an industrial
research organization, of course. In fact, the Federal
Government has gathered a group of experts to explore, through
the case method, what the best ways are to foster cooperation
among agencies and contractors working in the same field.
I might further mention that my description of N. I. H. has caused
knowing smiles among many here at M. I. T. -- apparently the
disease is widespread.
I will confine my investigation, however, to several
examples of innovations developed at the Engineering Research
Center and look at them in terms of some concepts that have been
proposed in areas that seem to bear on this problem. By far, the
most extensive work is in the area loosely described as "resistance
to change, " but additional insights may be gained by looking at
work done in marketing investigations on how new products are
introduced. The concept that I will apply to all the cases is
1
Kurt Lewin's "Force Field Analysis. " I feel the force field
concept will help clarify this investigation in the same way it is
designed to help clarify the situation for a problem solving manager.
1 Kurt Lewin, "Frontiers in Group Dynamics, " Human
Relations - June, 1947, Vol. I, No. 1 pp. 5-41.
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That is, by attempting to segregate and define the "forces", the
situation may be made clearer and some hypotheses proposed
from the various cases.
Purpose
The purpose of the study will be an attempt, by examining
the cases through the several concepts, to develop some
hypotheses about why some innovations are accepted and
enthusiastically used and others are not, why N.I.H. exists,
some examples of how it works and some proposals to overcome
it. Lastly, some suggestions will be made regarding testing the
proposals and where further work might be effective.
Data Collection
As I have mentioned, I was associated with the Research
Center for several years and so have intimate knowledge of
much of the background information given here. In addition,
while not directly connected with any of the cases used here, I
have some general knowledge with several of them. I also know
many of the people at the various plants listed in the cases. It
was not necessary, therefore, in my interviews for those being
interviewed to go into detail of background or to explain the
L _
position of the Center relative to the plants. While my association
with the Center may have aided the interviews, I am sure my
reporting of the cases is less than objective even though I have
been away from the Center for several years and had nothing to
do with the cases used.
The interviews were all in person at the Research Center
with the men (both supervisors and engineers) who worked on
the cases. They took several days and were conducted during
January and February 1967. One interview was conducted by
telephone, and this was the one "client" or user of an innovation
that was contacted. Since there is current work being conducted
between the Research Center and all the plants mentioned and
in most cases by the same individuals, I did not feel it appropriate
to contact the plants, since I am still identified with the Center
and would not be looked upon as an unbiased investigator. As
mentioned at the beginning of Case III, the client I contacted was
in the unique position of having been associated with two cases at
different plants, one which adopted an innovation and the other
which did not. This was the one client I felt obliged to attempt
to interview.
In order that my interviews have some semblance of
uniformity, I used a series of questions after a fairly consistent
don" ý- ---- 
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introduction of my purpose to all those interviewed. In every
case the questions led to more questions and even to several
suggested by those being interviewed as being appropriate to
the investigation. Listed below are the major or category
questions put to all of those interviewed.
1. Describe the innovation you have chosen as an
example.
2. How was contact made? That is, were you
contacted, did a third party tell you of an application,
did you contact the plant and what level (engineer,
supervisor) made the contact?
3. Who was contacted in the plant, a friend of yours
or someone here at the Center, a name given or
someone known to be working in the field?
4. How was the innovation introduced?
5. What was produced - i.e., did anything come of it?
6. Has it been used elsewhere ?
7. If a failure, that is no one is using it, have you tried
to introduce it elsewhere (if so, go back to 1, 2, 3
and 4).
8. Do you mind interview others here at the Center
involved in the case in order to get the picture from
where they sat?
16
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
Case Setting
Before outlining the cases, it may be well to describe
the setting in which they take place. The Company has many
manufacturing locations, and at each there is a force of
engineers. The engineer force is set up in departments,
several for product or production engineering, plant or factory
engineering, often a development department and usually a
machine design and a quality department. The innovations that
will be examined in the cases are production innovations, so the
pertinent engineering departments will be those of product and
development engineering. These departments may be looked on
as the customer or client of the Research Center, for the
innovations must be put into use by the development and product
engineers.
The Research Center was established in 1958. It was
fairly novel at that time in that it was established to do only
manufacturing research and development, no product development
which is done by the Product Laboratories for all the Company
divisions. The staff of the Research Center was composed
initially of men from the various plants, but the Center
rapidly recruited non-company engineers and scientists in
disciplines and advanced degrees not available at the plants.
The "charter" of the Research Center was to develop "new
ways to make things" and was to attack both the short range
bottleneck problem and the long range new art or application
of new art to old-art problems. All the plants were solicited
for tough problems and many were received. Since managers
and supervisors were brought together first in order to build
a Research Center staff, the problem of solicitation was done
by these managers with their counterparts at the plants.
Later, when work was begun on a few of the problems, the
Research Center engineers were started on their investigation
with little or no consultation with their counterparts at the plants.
Most significantly neither engineer group shared in discussing
the problems to be examined and whether they were appropriate
for Research Center investigation. In most cases the problems
selected initially were felt to be critical ones with high payoff
and with reasonable prospects of success. The Center is now
in its eighth year so that I must admit that a good portion of the
problems in receptivity to innovations had to do with establishing
a reputation and acceptance both among the plants and with the
Product Laboratories. However, I feel that problems of
8acceptance are a portion of many situations of receptivity to
innovations so do not feel the choice of cases is atypical.
The Concept of Force Field
As mentioned earlier, each case will be examined using
1
the concept of Force Field Analysis proposed by Kurt Lewin.
Such an analysis will hopefully give a common basis of
examination from which conclusions or implications may be
drawn. The total concept was evolved in order to examine
managerial problem- solving and the force field analysis
technique used as a means to conceptualize a problem situation
at a given time. Lewin felt strongly that opposing forces set up
a "quasi-stationary equilibrium" in any given situation and that
by defining these forces a beginning could be made in understanding
how changes took place. If a goal were pictured as an upper level
(in our case the acceptance and use of an innovation) Lewin
conceived of increasing (I) forces moving toward that level and
restraining (R) forces opposing. He represents the situation at
a point in time as some level short of the goal where the forces
are momentarily balanced. One of the more significant facets
of the force field concept is that the opposing forces create tension.
Ibid.
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the point of view, however, for as Thomas shows, there is a
tendency for I forces to be those of the person constructing
the analysis and the R forces to be those of others and the
environment. All the analyses are the author's and, therefore,
suffer this tendency. Each case description will follow with
a force field analysis and diagram of the problem field. The
relative strengths may not be pertinent in that the cases have
been resolved one way or the other and are not currently in a
state of tension waiting to be resolved. Not that tensions are
not still present, the interviews revealed attitudes and views
that constitute ready-made forces whenever a new innovation
is introduced. It may, therefore, be fruitful for organizations
to analyze past attempts at introduction of innovations to
understand the forces in any new attempt at introduction.
My resume of force field does not do justice to the
thorough and detailed theory that has been built up but only
explains that portion of the concept that will be used in examining
the cases.
2
John M. Thomas "Managerial Problem-Solving and
Force Field Analysis, " Unpublished report of investigations at
the Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, India.
CHAPTER III
THE CASES
The cases described below are all from examples of
attempts to introduce innovations, developed at the Research
Center, to the manufacturing plants for use in production.
They have been chosen as having represented substantial
effort at the Center and for having mixed success in reception.
It is the fact that the success of introduction varied that may
give some insight into factors affecting introduction.
Each case will be followed by a force field analysis and
diagram in an attempt to highlight some of the I and R forces
visible in the case. The following chapter will then treat the
cases in conglomeration and will attempt to apply theories and
thoughts to what appear to be common situations.
j_ ~ __ ~
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CASE I COIL WINDER
The coil winder case was one of the first investigations
of the newly created Research Center. In looking for likely
projects with which to begin, the Research Center managers
talked to their counterparts in the engineering organizations
at the manufacturing plants. Not only were new problems looked
at, but new concepts or ways of manufacturing old, high volume,
products were considered to be potential cases. One such class
of high volume product was the various coils manufactured at
several plants in high volume. A coil here is defined as a fairly
small, say one half-inch to four inch long, many-layered winding
of fine wire. They are used in electro-mechanical equipment
as electro-magnetic actuators and in electronic equipment.
There appeared to be area for improvement in manufacture,
because while very high speed machinery had been developed for
winding the coil, the finishing operations were done by hand.
Finishing operations include such things as pulling or "fishing"
the leads out to a terminal, removing the insulation, cutting
the leads to length and soldering them to terminals. The labor
cost for hand finishing constituted a substantial portion of the
total coil cost, so with millions of coils in production, automatic
finishing could pay off handsomely! It is significant that the
managers agreed that this was an appropriate project, more
on this later.
A group was set up at the Research Center to work on
the case. The problem areas such as insulation removal, cut
off, terminal attachment (wrap and soldering) wire tension and
others were assigned to individuals or teams. As progress was
made discussions and consultations within the group evolved
a concept for an automatic machine. Some product design
changes were necessary but preliminary checking indicated the
changes could be allowed. Experimental set ups of the
components of an automatic machine were built and finally it
was decided that a prototype machine would be built to prove
in all the concepts working together. I will examine introduction
of the machine at each of several plants that eventually became
involved to see what the various receptions will reveal.
Plant I
At this point we have progressed to where an operable
prototype machine had been built at the Research Center. Not
much contact had been made in either direction between the
Research Center and Plant I where the project concept originated.
14
The machine was taken to the plant for a demonstration. The
plant engineer's reaction was, "Why are you working on coil
winding? We are !" The machine did not get much farther
than that. Some of the individual concepts incorporated in the
machine were said to be somewhat novel and could possibly be
incorporated in the local machine, but it did not in general
appear to solve the problem.
In my interviews it was apparent that the essentially
total rejection of the machine by Plant I still bothered the
Research Center after two years. In addition, there is evidence
(see Plant 5) that Plant I continued to hold some resentment
toward the Center regarding the coil winder. The Center
resentment is particularly interesting in that they are now aware
that the project had been started in direct competition with an
effort at Plant I. They are aware it appears to the Plant I
engineer level, where none of the initial discussions had been
held, that the Center simply moved in to get the credit for what
seemed to be a lucrative cost reduction case. The Center,
knowing this, and now making rules for itself about taking on a
case where others are working, still has some resentment which
will probably interfere with future communication. It would
appear then that rejection of innovations may have effects beyond
those observed at the time of rejection.
The concept that comes to mind that would apply here
3 4
is that of Coch and French and Zander that resistance can be
expected if those to be changed (Plant 1) do not participate or
have some "say" in the nature of the change. As mentioned
earlier, all the discussion and decision making was done at a
high level, from which vantage point the project appeared to
be a good one. However, none of the engineers working on a
new machine at Plant 1 were brought in on the discussion, yet
they were the men who would be required to incorporate the
Center developed machine into Plant 1 production. It seems,
however, that there was some recognition by the high level
managers that possible difficulties might develop in having the
two engineering groups competing on developing an automatic
machine, even working on the same coil. The recognition appears
in words used at the time, such as: "The potential savings are
so large the investment in competing teams is justified, " or
"By having competing developments, the very best should evolve."
The difficulty, of course, was that the development was in no way
cooperative and one of the teams (Plant 1 engineers) would decide
3
L. Coch and J. R. P. French, Jr. , "Overcoming Resistance
to Change, " In Proshansky and Seiderber, eds. Basic Studies in
Social Psychology (New York, 1966), pp. 444-460.
4
Alvin Zander, "Resistance to Change: Its Analysis and
Prevention," Advanced Management, Vol. 15, January 1950, pp. 9-11.
L _
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which development to use.
Plant 1 Force Field Analysis
At this point one of Lewin's precepts comes into focus,
that is that if an R (restraining or negative) force is reduced it
may actually be converted into an I (increasing or positive)
force. If the Plant 1 engineers had been made accomplices to
the Research Center effort, they would probably not have resisted
as much and would possibly have worked actively toward adoption
of the innovation. It would seem, however, that when two groups
are in competition (as expressed by R Force No. 1 below) by
5
working on the same project there will be problems. Schein
states that, ". . . competition between the units or groups of a
single organization or system must in the long run reduce
effectiveness because competition leads to faulty communication,...
and to commitment to subgroup rather than organizational goals. "
My interviews did not touch all facets of the problem, I am sure,
but I will construct a force field diagram and will list those forces
that were either expressed or implied:
5
Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Psychology, Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey. Prentice-Hall, 1965, p. 105.
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R FORCES
1. Plant 1 engineers working on own machine
2. Resented "surprise" intrusion of "outside" group
3. Machine not adoptable to peculiar problems of Plant 1
I FORCES
4. Development "agreed to" by Plant 1 (at top level--
engineers not committed), therefore, Plant 1 should
be receptive. Research Center self righteous
5. Conviction the Center machine a step forward,
2
pp 1~ r1
L 4
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I FOR CES
Force Field Diagram No. 1 Coil Winder, Plant 1
6
4
unique and better
6. Need to get innovation accepted by a Plant
1 R FORCES
3
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The major feature of the Plant 1 coil case appears to
me to be the way in which the Plant 1 engineers were forced
into an attitude of N. I. H. They were given no voice in the
agreement to use their development domain for a Research
Center Case. They were not brought in during development,
not allowed to identify with the Research Center work. Finally,
they continued their own competitive development, and then
before it was completed and proven or disproven they were asked
to accept the competitive machine. Could they have reacted in
any other way? Not if they had developed even the smallest
amount of group pride and team spirit. This case might suggest
that N. I. H. is not so much an inherent attitude of technical groups
as it is the creation of the proponents of the change. We may see
other cases that confirm this.
Plant 2
This plant, in contrast to Plant 1, had a problem with a
new type coil and had no development staff to work out new
manufacturing methods. The production engineers at Plant 2
heard about the machine being developed at the Research Center
and asked could the machine be adapted to their coil. The center
agreed to modify the drawings and build an experimental machine.
ak r' ~rvn~ v1 =rr =IrPIYP7 nrcciiricf rlivrivmri thp tirrP thp frrrtAtvflP
-ri- = +nr-+ n-nei n reernen t occurred all- -urr ur in +hp +iurnp vhA ro vor] pe
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machine using the Plant 1 coil was in final development.
The Plant 2 engineers had production schedules to meet
so purchased a commercial machine which left many operations
to be completed by hand. During development and construction
of the Plant 2 machine, frequent meetings were held by Center
and Plant 2 engineers to discuss needs, designs, capabilities
and priorities. The machine that was built was completely
automatic; bobbins were dumped in one end and completed, wound,
taped and terminated coils were automatically unloaded at the
other. The machine was not, however, economically much
superior to the commercial machine including the manual finishing
operations. Plant 2 engineers asked that the Research Center
restudy the problem and make recommendations; the automatic
nnc~l ~ n~ rr\l L~+ h++ A 1, ~~~~+ 4+ 417 Ar;~~ +VI +frmachine concept was not rejected, but it was recognized that to
be competitive the machine would have to produce coils at a much
higher rate. Two more commercial machines were purchased
in order to complete schedules but interest in the Center machine
remained high.
The Research Center examined those portions of the
automatic machine that added most to cost while inhibiting higher
output. By eliminating the automatic load and unload features and
redesigning other portions for higher speed, the machine was
reduced in cost by about one quarter and output was considerably
i20
increased. The machine thus developed was particularly
attractive to Plant 2 because it not only proved to be an excellent
cost reduction over the commercial machine, it automatically
performed some of the most troublesome operations. There
are currently six of these machines in operation at Plant 2
with three more on order to provide complete capacity.
There are a couple of features of the Plant 2 case that
are interesting. First, Plant 2 engineers apparently never lost
enthusiasm for the Research Center machine, although it would
have been easy to do so after the failure of the first experimental
machine. An understanding of why they did not lose their
enthusiasm would be most revealing. My conjecture would be
that they were thoroughly committed to the Research Center
effort because they had initiated it with a request for help. If
this is even partly what is behind the enthusiasm, effort to get
a client involved to the point of asking for help is extremely useful
in innovation introduction. There is support for this view in
Bennis, Schein, Berlew and Steele where among conditions listed
for a change to take place, under "defensive" or poor conditions
is, "Target (client) role non-voluntarily acquired, " while under
"positive" is, "Target takes role voluntarily. " Also in the same
list is another aspect which has meaning in this situation which
is that under "positive" is listed, "Target is free to leave situation, "
Yc;;c~00=ý
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6
and "Target can terminate change process. " When the client
asks for help both conditions are met, that is, he voluntarily
assumes the role of client and he feels free to leave the situation.
The second feature is that during the interview it became apparent
that after the failure of the first machine the Research Center
considered dropping the project. They had invested considerable
time and money and had no assurance further effort would pay
off. It seems, however, that a supervisor was sure the machine
was basically a good design and was determined to see it used.
Through his effort development was continued and the successful
machine was designed and built.
The emergence of a "champion" for the machine is a
7 8
particularly interesting development, Morison and Shon both
feel that a champion is often, if not always, necessary to carry
a new and different innovation from development to use. The
concept is that the inventor is often not the person best able to
6 Warren G. Bennis, Edgar H. Schein, David E. Berlew
and Fred I. Steele, Eds., Interpersonal Dynamics, Homewood,
Illinois, The Dorsey Press 1964, p. 375.
7
Elting E. Morison, "A Case Study of Innovation, " The
Planning of Change, Bennis, Benne and Chin, Eds. , New York,
Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1961, pp. 592-605.
8 Donald A. Shon, "Champions for Radical New Inventions,"
Harvard Business Review, (March - April, 1963), pp. 77-87.
iL
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carry an innovation through to use. Morison feels the inventor
is often satisfied with the pleasure of invention and does not
have the sense of social necessity needed to push it. What is
needed, he feels, is an entrepreneur type who sees the
application and widespread use of the innovation as his goal.
The champion may be useful to an R and D organization for
other reasons. Case IV will look at a champion type and how he
interacts with a receiving organization. The summary will
suggest an overall strategy and purpose for use of champions
as well as some difficulties.
23
Plant 2 Force Field Analysis
This portion of the case is a successful example, so the
analysis shows the level to have reached the goal level, that is, use
of the coil winder in production at Plant 2. The interesting point that
this analysis reveals is that some of the R forces found in Plant 1
have been converted to I forces that helped push to the goal level.
R FOR CES
1. Schedule requirements-production requirements
before the Research Center machine could be
completed
2. Commercial machine that could do the job.
Once purchased, inertia to continue works
against machine change
3. First experimental machine not economically
attractive
4. After first failure, too much time and money
spent by the Research Center
I FOR CES
5. Enthusiasm of Plant 2 engineers that the automatic
features of the Center machine were much better
than the commercial machine
6. Conviction of the champion that the machine was
better and could be made economically attractive
7. Need to get an innovation accepted by plant
R FORCES
AL
6
I FORCES
Force Field Diagram No. 2 - Coil Winder, Plant 2
Plant 3
The Plant 3 story is similar to the Plant 2 story without some
of the complications involved at Plant 2. Plant 3 had a new complex
coil to manufacture of the new type that the Research Center machine
was designed to produce automatically. The coil required all the
automatic features of the machine, and therefore made the full machine
economically attractive. The Plant 3 engineers, much as the Plant 2
engineers, had a problem and were actively searching for a solution.
They visited the Center as soon as they heard of the coil machine,
which was at about the time the first Plant 2 machine was being checked
out. They were so sure of success of the machine they requested
4
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rmodified drawings for their coil and ordered a machine. They now
have two machines that are producing their full requirements.
Plant 3 Force Field Analysis
Again the goal level was reached and this time with no apparent
R forces at work.
R FORCES
1. None
I FORCES
2. New, difficult coil with no production solution
3. Enthusiasm of Plant 3 engineers that the Center
machine could automatically produce their coil
as it could the Plant 2 coil
4. Conviction of the Research Center that the machine
could do the job
R FORCES
A A AL
I FORCES
Force Field Diagram No. 3 - Coil Winder, Plant 3
L L
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Plant 4
At one point in the evolution of the machine a short movie was
produced to demonstrate its capabilities in a way observation of the
machine would not reveal (slow motion, focusing on one function of
the machine and magnifying some portion). This film was seen by
several plants including Plant 4. Engineers at Plant 4 became in-
terested in using the machine on a miniature coil, again the machine
presented a solution to a problem. The Plant 4 people came to the
Center to see the prototype machine. By this time the Center had
had the experience of both machines at Plant 2, and modified drawings
for the miniature coil less the automatic load and unload features per
Plant 2. That machine has been in production now about a year and
is producing total Plant 4 requirements.
Plant 4 Force Field Analysis
The analysis is identical with Diagram number 3 - Plant 3.
Plant 5
This case is the most recent, and from a company standpoint
is hopefully not closed as yet. Plant 5 also had a coil it thought could
be produced on the new machine and so visited Plant 3 and Plant 1 in
that order. If my report has not conveyed it, I want to say that my
impression is that Plant 2 was the most enthusiastic of the plants
(which is probably apparent from the sustained enthusiasm required).
I
I say this in order to contrast Plant 3, which I think was happy with
their machine, but since they overcame no difficulties were just that -
happy with it. At any rate Plant 5 engineers visited Plant 3 and then
Plant 1 (who now had their own machine) and wrote a report. The
report indicated that the Center machine at Plant 3 was unsatisfactory,
had given serious maintenance problems and would therefore not be
considered. I was told that the Research Center called Plant 3 where
it had some close contacts and was told that none of the derogatory
information had come from Plant 3 and that when the Plant 5 people
had left, they had been enthusiastic about the Research Center machine!
Now it is obvious that my case is incomplete in that I was not able to
interview Plant 5 on this and did not, partly because I felt the situation
was still active and did not want to introduce some feelings that would
possibly hinder future negotiations. In addition, Plant 5 may get
further information from other plants, such as Plant 2, but it must
be remembered that Plant 5 now has a report that it must defend so
it is not likely that they will use a Center machine.
One of the most interesting aspects of this situation to me is
the point mentioned under Plant 1; that after several years, Plant 1
still bears a grudge against the Research Center of such magnitude
as to cause them to still shoot down the Center development. Again
I must add that I do not know whether Plant 1 feels their machine
applicable to Plant 5, but the report mentions only the failure of the
L _
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Center machine. There is no question that when R forces are
marshalled against invading I forces, the R forces are not easily
dispersed.
Plant 5 Force Field Analysis
The same forces are at work here that are at work in several
of the other plant cases, Plants 1, 2, 3 and 4. Not all, but many of
both the increasing forces and restraining forces are summarized
here and at the moment the quasi-stationary level is far short of the
goal level.
R FOR CES
1. Plant 1 resentment made up of the forces analyzed
under Plant 1:
a. Research Center "intrusion"
b. Plant 1 developing own ma chine
c. Center machine does not solve problems
2. Maintenance of Center machine highlighted
3. What might be called an I force reduction - the moderate
"selling" job of Plant 3
I FORCES
4. Plant 3 satisfaction with the machine
5. Need for an automatic machine by Plant 5
6. Conviction by the Research Center that their machine
will do the job
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Force Field Diagram No. 4 - Coil Winder, Plant 5
The Force Field Analysis certainly points up the fact that
when resistance is created, either directly as in Plant 1 or indirectly,
as in Plant 5 it is a difficult thing to overcome indeed. The analysis
suggests further, as does Lewin, that the most effective way (in this
case the only way) to achieve the goal level is by reduction of R forces.
It also seems that the R forces are not only reduced, they are usually
converted so that as in the case of Plant 2 they substantially contribute
to the change in level. Again from this case it would appear that
N.I. H. is made not born.
4
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CASE II CAPACITOR STUDIES
The second case in my investigation began quite differently from
the first case and, since it was begun some years after the Center
started, is more applicable to the continuing problems of rejection
of innovations. The case was an application in a new field developed
from a previous Research Center success. The Center envisaged a
radical new method of manufacture of an existing product which was
the responsibility of engineers at one of the plants. Unfortunately,
the plant responsible for the existing product was not made a
partner in the investigation, apparently because the Center assumed
the innovation would be so appealing that the responsible engineers
would do handsprings to incorporate it as the method of manufacture
at the plant.
I will call this plant, Plant 6, not only so that we may differentiate
it as a case from the plants of the coil winder case, but because it
happens to be a plant not involved in the other cases, so did not have
attitudes generated by previous experience with the Center. I should
also take the time to describe Plant 6 in relation to the other plants
and, indeed, to the Company. It is the mother plant. All the other
plants can trace their origins to Plant 6. At one time it was head-
quarters for all company engineering, and even as other plants were
built, it historically had been given the pre-eminent engineering role.
21L-'- ··~I
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It is now an old plant, and newer, more modern plants have been
given engineering control for the newer products. Today Plant 6 is
much like France, living in the memory of former glories and where
possible exerting all the intransigence that was formerly her right
and an expression of her position. Of course, the plant has been and
is being modernized, and the engineers have been assigned challenging
new problems, but to many the haughty attitude remains. I cite this
to highlight the fact that the Center should have been overcautious in
involving Plant 6 in the project, of making sure they were committed
and "on board." The Center is made up of scientists and engineers,
not behaviorists, and so relied on the inherent appeal of the innova-
tion to overcome all objections.
To get on with the case, the Research Center had been successful
in developing a method of passing parts into and out of a vacuum on a
continuous basis without breaking or reducing the vacuum. It occurred
to some of the Research Center engineers that the new ability opened
the door to an entirely new concept of capacitor manufacture. The
particular type capacitor being considered was currently in produc-
tion at Plant 6. The first step in current manufacture at the plant
consisted of inserting a large, wide roll of plastic film in a specially
designed vacuum chamber that then deposited metal on the plastic as
the film was unreeled and rereeled. The total process took place
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inside the chamber, so the vacuum had to be broken and repumped for
each roll. After metal deposit, the roll was sliced into narrow strips
the size of the finished capacitor. There followed many separate
operations of winding, terminating and finishing the capacitor.
The concept that evolved at the Research Center would use plastic
strip of the size of the completed capacitor. With the coil winder
experience behind them a completely automatic operation was envisaged.
Plastic strip would be fed into the vacuum chamber, metal deposited
and the strip fed into an automatic winding, terminating and sealing
machine that would eject completed capacitors. The project was
divided into teams or groups that were to work on the major components
of the system. As mentioned earlier, there was little or no contact
between the Center and Plant 6 on this project. The whole idea had
been generated at the Center and was being pursued there. It turned
out, as so often happens, that the portion that had looked achievable
was extremely difficult, and the portion that had appeared doubtful
yielded to the effort. In particular it was found that feeding thin
plastic foil in and out of a vacuum was a different problem from feeding
parts in and out of a vacuum. In addition, continuous metal deposition
presented problems different from the batch process. On the other
hand, the machine designed to automatically wind, terminate and seal
came along very well. It had several novel features and turned out to
be of interest on its own for manufacture of several types of film
capacitors.
As work continued on the vacuum and deposition equipment, a
working model of a capacitor winder was constructed. Some key
people from Plant 6 engineering were invited to see the machine and
comment on it. This was a good move by the Center, for although
Plant 6 may have been opposed to the Center effort on principle,
these men were given an "inside" look and were solicited as to
criticisms and suggestions. An approach of this sort can indeed
help relations, for Plant 6 felt that many of the ideas incorporated
in the laboratory machine were unique and could solve problems
they were having on winding other types of capacitors. The Center
and the Plant 6 engineers agreed that the winding and terminating
equipment held immediate promise without the full concept of
complete assembly from plastic film to finished capacitor. The
Center, therefore, took steps to design a machine for another Plant
6 capacitor of different construction that could, nevertheless,
benefit from the winding and terminating techniques. There was
some interaction of Research Center and Plant 6 design engineers,
but it was not overly friendly or collaborative. Plant 6 eventually
ordered several of these machines, but the capacitor for which they
were designed was discontinued, so they were modified for still
From the Research Center end there was continual
he capacitor design changed, for they found they were
t was an experimental capacitor. When that capacitor
the machines were modified for another. The
not been particularly successful and have been
heir difficulty of maintenance. The Center feels the
ow producing a product for which they were not
int out the equipment is fairly sophisticated and
edgeable repair. Instances were cited where a portion
was removed when no one knew how to repair it.
has slowly drifted into disillusionment as Plant 6
iticize and showed no interest in further investigation.
Labit of some Plant 6 engineering supervisors to make
noney wasted in the investigation, so that today the
hostile to that group (and I assume vice versa).
s ago the Center decided to abandon the investigation.
.ological narration of the case had been given me, I
* other cases, to get those I interviewed to speculate
t wrong and what they would change if they had it to
strongest reaction I got from all those I talked to about
hat as the Center progressed in its investigation,
Sits own research staff to do parallel investigation.
They now say that if nothing else, they have spurred Plant 6 into
doing (constructive) things they would not have done, such as build
competence in research. Obviously, it is a moot point whether in
fact that happened, but the Center feels that in every area in which
investigation was started it soon had a large force doing similar
work at Plant 6. I heard such phrases as, "completely frustrating
but not a waste" and "never will get a sense of accomplishment. "
As to what they would change there is a strong feeling that the
"Center can't design a big piece of equipment and hand it to someone
unless there is very complete understanding. " The case was a
particular disappointment to the Research Center because no other
plant could use the development, in contrast to the coil winder case.
I was told the Center would not now start a case (or at least this
group would not) unless there was prospect for multiple applications.
Plant 6 Force Field Analysis
I feel that the analysis should only cover the winding-terminating
machine, for if this had been successfully adopted, the case would
have been considered a success regardless of the fact that the
complete concept had not been achieved. Even though several of the
machines are currently running, they are apparently being used in a
manner much less sophisticated than their design intent so that the
Center considers the project a relative failure. In the force field
view, also, it is apparent that the R forces were never r(
the point where a goal level was achieved. It is again sig
note that, as in Plant 1, there still exists some enmity b(
groups that continue to affect future dealings. This price
much higher one than that invested in the case.
R FORCES
1. Center working in area in which Plant 6 responsible
2. Center proposing to change existing methods developed
by Plant 6
3. Plant 6 pride - "we can do anything the Center can in
this area" historical eminence
4. No skilled repairmen trained
I FORCES
5. New development uniquely applicable to capacitors
6. New concept could only be developed at Center where
vacuum concept originated
7. Plant 6 engineers brought in to see laboratory model
8. Plant 6 capacitor winding problems
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CASE III INVENTORY CONTROL
This case and Case IV are associated for two reasons. They were
both conducted by the Operations Research section of the Research
Center, but more important for this study, even though they involve
different plants, one of the plant supervisors is associated with both
cases. It seems he was transferred (and promoted) in the time
between the two cases. Because of this I made an effort to obtain an
interview with this man because it so happened that one case ended
in failure and the other success. I felt this circumstance should be
a particularly useful one because here was an outsider - non Research
Center employee - working with the Center on two projects, one a
success, the other a failure. The question immediately is: what
was the difference? What circumstances, approach, individuals or
what-have-you made the difference ?
Case III, like Case I, was begun as one of the early efforts of the
Center. It also resembles Case II in that the Center felt it had a
package to offer, to apply to problem areas in the plants. Unlike the
mechanization group who looked for specific plant problems to attack,
the operations research or computer specialists looked for general
problems with which to propose solutions, and then to fit the newly
developed techniques to a specific plant problem. The Center,
therefore, spent some time working out concepts, computer programs
and appropriate equipment before it looked for a plant at which to
apply them.
The reader may ask, is the stage already set to create N. I. H?
It is interesting to notice as the interview unfolds with the then
Plant 2 supervisor that his reactions of a development being forced
on him are so much like those of the antagonistic Plant 1 and Plant 6
even though with his Case IV experience he has no ill will toward
the Center. The Plant 2 in this case is the same Plant 2 of Case I.
This case occurred before Plant 2 was involved in Case I, and it was
obvious on that case that the plant as a whole (different departments
were involved) had no "built in" resentment from this case.
The Research Center developed some ideas about improved
inventory control and scheduling techniques that had been checked out
by model simulation. They looked for a likely shop in some plant
in which to apply the concept and used the criteria of high pay-back
quickly realized as was described earlier for the first cases. They
picked an old shop at Plant 2 with which some of the Center people
were very familiar. They felt that here was a very likely spot to
prove the worth of the concept, with a long history of operation that
could be used to verify improvement and one in which progress would
show good gains. The Center investigation at Plant 2 was approved
at a high level, and the Center started in to study the shop and
qL
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implement the new concept. It was not until this time that the Plant
2 engineers were brought into the picture. They were hostile to the
ideas. They had some ideas of their own about what computer should
be used and how it should be used. When the Research Center went
into the shop, they met resistance. They were young, bright men
with advanced degrees and talked a jargon foreign to the shop jargon.
They had no shop experience or background. The shop foremen were
old, experienced hands who resisted the ideas of these outsiders.
The Research Center found continued resistance as they worked.
They were unable to implement any of their ideas and in frustration
decided that an old shop was not the place to begin work with the new
concepts. They requested and were given backing to withdraw from
Plant 2 and begin work at a new plant recently opened in which the
new concepts could be used from the start. The Research Center
engineers felt Plant 2 fought them, was resistive to new ideas and
was in general difficult to work with. A typical case of N. I. H.
Let us go back now and examine how these same events appeared
to the Plant 2 engineering supervisor responsible for this shop. His
general statement as to how the Research Center effort appeared,
"They had a solution and were looking for a place to put it. " He then
told me the shop and engineering situation at the time the Research
Center appeared. The shop had a long history of quality difficulties;
They had no shop experience or background. The shop foremen were
j old, experienced hands who resisted the ideas of these outsiders.old, experienced hands who resisted the ideas of these outsiders.i
The esearch Center found continued resistance as they worked.
They were unable to implement any of their ideas and in frustration
decided that an old shop was not the place to begin work with the new
concepts. They requested and were given backing to withdraw from
Plant 2 and begin work at a new plant recently opened in which the
new concepts could be used from the start. The Research Center
engineers felt Plant 2 fought them, was resistive to new ideas and
was in general difficult to work with. A typical case of N. I. H.
Let us go back now and examine how these same events appeared
to the Plant 2 engineering supervisor responsible for this shop. His
general statement as to how the Research Center effort appeared,
"They had a solution and were looking for a place to put it. " He then
told me the shop and engineering situation at the time the Research
Center appeared. The shop had a long history of quality difficulties;
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wonder that the Center got little cooperation from the shop.
The Plant 2 engineers also had internal reasons to be less than
enthusiastic about the Center coming on the scene. They had been
working: for some time on a scheme to perhaps do half the thin~s
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it had had "fourteen years of quality misery" in which it had been
out of control. I was told that the one thing the shop did not want at
that time was for anyone to come in and rock the boat. Small
onder that the nter got little c operation from the shop.
he lant 2 e gineers also had internal reasons to be less than
nthusiastic bout the nter oming n the cene. hey ad een
orking or ome ime n  cheme o erhaps o alf he hings
the Center proposed. An authorization for a computer had just made
it to the desk of the Plant Manager (we can imagine the work to get
it there) when the Research Center showed up. The authorization
was sent back, and the engineers were instructed to wait and see
what the Center wanted. Several expressions were used by the
supervisor to describe the resulting conflict. He saw the "pride of
ownership" of his engineers in wanting the computer and concept
they had developed, and he also spoke of the Center pride in insisting
that the computer they recommended was the only one. He told me
there was never any attempt to come to some compromise on the
two approaches. In the end neither was followed as the Center
withdrew, but the authorization had been killed. About half of the
Plant 2 scheme was eventually implemented by means other than
with a computer. The wonder is that the Plant 2 rejection of the
Center was not more widespread and longer lasting!
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Force Field Analysis
R FORCES
1. Shop quality concerns
2. Inventory plan of Plant 2
3. Rejection of computer authorization
. Pride f ownership: own shop, own plan; outsiders
o ictate
. o articipation in shop selection for Center study
I FORCES
. ew oncept to cure plant ills
. eed or first application success
. rove uccess to old associates
. acking of Plant 2 upper levels
0. lant  eed for modern inventory system
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in that this was a multi-plant project. The fact that a team was
put together of men from several organizations may, in part,
explain the project's success. The previous cases indicate that
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CASE IV TEAM PROJECT
This roject differs from the thers that have been discussed
in that this as a ulti-plant roject. he fact that a team as
put together of en from several organizations ay, in art,
xplain the roject's success. he revious ases indicate that
much group resistance to change has to do with group pride and
defense of group norms and ways of doing things. The project
team had no history of association so had no reservation about
the project group working on the problem. Individual members
had the defense of their old group attitudes to remember, of
course, but at least the new group had no incentive to reject the
project out of hand. There were other reasons why the project
should succeed as we shall see. Not only were inter-personal
and intergroup relations well handled, but the innovation itself
was a dramatic success!
The problem facing the company managers was this: for the
last several years demand of electrical cable had exceeded total
company capacity. In each of these years several million dollars
premium, that is cost above the cost of company produced cable,
had been paid outside suppliers. There was also concern about the
quality of this cable as compared to that produced in house. Cable
was produced at four plants, two of which produced all but a small
much group resistance to change has to do with group pride and
defense of group norms and ways of doing things. The project
team had no history of association so had no reservation about
the project group working on the problem. Individual members
had the defense of their old group attitudes to remember, of
course, but at least the new group had no incentive to reject the
project out of hand. There were other reasons why the project
should succeed as we shall see. Not only were inter-personal
and intergroup relations well handled, but the innovation itself
as  ramatic uccess!
The problem facing the company managers was this: for the
last several years demand of electrical cable had exceeded total
company capacity. In each of these years several million dollars
premium, that is cost above the cost of company produced cable,
had been paid outside suppliers. There was also concern about the
quality of this cable as compared to that produced in house. Cable
was produced at four plants, two of which produced all but a small
I
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quantity of specialty orders produced at the other two plants. One
of the two large producing plants was located in the Midwest, the
other on the east coast. Since the product was so bulky and customers
were spread all over the nation, orders were allocated to the plant by
the geographical location of the customer, the Mississippi River the
dividing line.
As the managers discussed the problem of production capacity,
several questions arose such as: is there a more efficient shift
configuration, three shift five days or six, two shift seven, etc.,
with relation to employee cost and machine maintenance and repair
down time. Also, with the hundreds of combinations of cable
design, number of conductors, color coding, conductor size and
cable sheath material, were the plants making the most effective
set-ups and most economical production runs ? How did these runs
fit in with the shift alternative ? And finally, how about the most
economical shipping, did we have it? Even with all the facts
assembled, the answer combinations were formidable, so the
Research Center was asked in essence, can you get any more
production from the plants ?
The engineering supervisor who had been at Plant 2 during
Case III and was now at the east coast plant felt that one of the main
differences in dealing with the Center on the two cases was that in
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As the managers discussed the problem of production capacity,
several questions arose such as: is there a more efficient shift
configuration, three shift five days or six, two shift seven, etc.,
with relation to employee cost and machine maintenance and repair
down time. lso, ith the hundreds of combinations of cable
design, number of conductors, color coding, conductor size and
cable sheath material, were the plants making the most effective
set-ups and most economical production runs ? How did these runs
fit in with the shift alternative ? And finally, how about the most
economical shipping, did we have it? ~Even with all the facts
assembled, the answer combinations were formidable, so the
Research Center was asked in essence, can you get any more
production from the plants ?
The engineering supervisor who had been at Plant 2 during
Case III and was now at the east coast plant felt that one of the main
differences in dealing with the Center on the two cases was that in
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might apply to this problem. The idea, of course, was to build a
linear program that would include all the many variables. A task
force was set up with representation from all the interested parties,
and it was decided after some meetings that a work group should
set up shop at the Research Center where computer facilities were
at hand. The first task was to gather data, and here again the
former Plant 2 supervisor indicated the right moves were made.
One knowledgeable Research Center engineering supervisor became
the contact for the plants and the representative of the group at the
Center. It was said of him that he listened. This comment seems
to me to be particularly significant for what it implies. To say that
he listened is to indicate that he was not only attentive and made an
effort to understand but was also somehow sympathetic to the
sneaker's noint of view tin this case the plant's~. The fact that
iCi__
speaker's point of view tin this case the plant's). The fact that
listening was highlighted as a particularly complementary attribute
also indicates that it was absent from the Plant 2 experience with
the Center. He spent time making sure that the plants were well
informed of the status of the work. An example was given in which
the total capacity of the plant had to be determined, including down
time, shift changes, cable code changes and the like. The team
I
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this one the response was "maybe we can help" when asked, rather
than "we have a solution, show us some of your problems. " Indeed,
the Center did answer that yes, they did have some techniques that
ight apply to this problem. he idea, of course, as to uild a
linear rogram that ould include all the any riables.  task
force as set up ith representation from ll the int rested arties,
and it as decided after some eetings that a ork group should
set up shop at the esearch nter here omputer facilities ere
at hand. The first task as to gather data, and here again the
former lant 2 supervisor indicated the right oves ere ade.
ne knowledgeable esearch enter e gineering supervisor ecame
the contact for the plants and the representative of the roup at the
nter. t as aid f im hat e istened. his omment ems
to e to be articularly significant for hat it i plies. o say that
he listened is to indicate that e as ot nly tt ntive nd ade an
ffort to nderstand ut as lso somehow ympathetic t  the
p aker's oint f iew (in his ase he lant's). he act hat
listening as highlighted as a articularly co plementary attribute
also indicates that it as absent from the lant 2 xp rience ith
the enter. e spent time aking sure that the lants ere ell
informed of the status of the ork. n example as given in hich
the total capacity of the plant had to be etermined, including down
time, shift changes, cable code changes and the like. he team
46
gathered all the components to make the estimate. During the time
the estimating was being done, the plant started to conjure up the
injustice of the over estimate that they were sure would be produced
by the team. Counter arguments were formed, for no estimate was
as good as actual production experience and the plant knew all the
kinds of things that could go wrong but would not show up in an
estimate. They were quite surprised and pleased when the estimate
came out less than the figure believed to be the best the plant could
possibly do. The plant felt then that no one was trying to "beat them
down" in order to make it appear on paper that there was more
capacity. It was also reported with pleasure that the team
representative always came back with any figures that were to be
used, such as the estimate above, for approval by the plant before
they were used, but more important before anyone else saw them.
These figures were treated as the property of the plant, and the
plant sensing this, had confidence in the team. It is obvious here
just how important is consideration for the group being effected. The
team representative was in some measure like the project or innova-
tion champion spoken of earlier. He was the fellow who understood
the technical people at the Center but also understood the needs of
those at the plants. Through him both groups had their say and
felt they were a part of the effort.
---"I_i __
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The solution has had dramatic results. All ordering for the
nation is being done at a central control with access to a computer.
The control establishes which plant will produce the order using
criteria such as customer location, similar orders, length of run,
machine and labor availability and order priority. It examines all
of the some four thousand combinations of cable design and machine
combinations available and how they relate to geographic location.
The run takes two hours each day on a 7094 computer, but daily
delivery promises and daily production runs are given incorporating
each order. Not only that, but management can now ask questions
such as what effect shift combinations or maintenance combinations
might have on production and get an answer back to questions that
were heretofore impossible to answer quantitatively. Did the effort
solve the problem? By more efficient scheduling and combining of
production runs on a national basis, capacity has been "created" to
the extent that no outside purchase will be required and the two low
level (and higher cost) plants will no longer produce cable. The
statement was made during the interview at the Research Center
that no N. I. H. was evident in this case. When asked to compare the
two cases, the engineering supervisor at the plants said that in the
Case III approach, the Center had its mind made up, ignored the plant
and was intent in getting only those ideas implemented. In Case IV,
they actively asked for plant participation and suggestions. They
continually solicited approval and listened to comments. Here was
the same man, the most influential individual on both projects as
far as acceptance by his plant was concerned, considered on the one
hand to be resisting the innovation to such an extent that the Center
withdrew to a new plant, and on the other considered to be one of
the major factors in implementing acceptance of the innovation.
It would seem that the approach of the Research Center helped create
N.I.H. in the first case and helped overcome it in the second.
Force Field Analysis of Case IV
The attitudes and convictions that constituted the major R forces
were not reported in the body of the case. The primary one was a
conflict between the work group at the Center and group in the
Finance organization whose job it is to oversee all computer appli-
cations. The complaint of the Finance group was that this scheme
did not fit in with their overall and long range plans. This conflict
was resolved when a "good theory x" decision was made by a Finance
supervisor that this project shall run. With that consideration set
aside the basic problem became the problem itself, with the solution
the largest linear program ever written for the company or at the
Research Center.
R FORCES
1. Finance group's own long range plans
2. Concern of plants that they would be "used"
I FORCES
3. Multi-organization team
4. High level backing
5. Understanding approach to plants
6. "Champion" established as go between
R FORCES
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Force Field Diagram No. 7 - Team Project
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Conclusions
The major impact of the examination of the cases seems to me
to be that contrary to the proposition set forth by the title, the problem
is not, "how to overcome N. I. H. ", but how to prevent creating it. How
to prevent creating N. I. H. will be the first area examined in looking
at ways in which a research organization can operate to gain acceptance.
A major source of information will be the force field analyses. By
examining those cases in which N. I. H. was created as opposed to
those in which it did not appear we may have patterns develop that
will allow a hypothesis to be proposed. Following the first examination,
several concepts will be presented for what might be called "techniques"
that could be used in introducing technical innovations to technical
organizations. Some of these concepts can be somewhat substantiated
by the cases. Others evolve from studying the literature with the
experiences of the cases in mind. Concepts that will be covered
include; the champion versus the inventor, the innovator role, identi-
fication with the present state and the group climate.
Force Field Analyses
I have just stated that the major impact of this study is the
L
hypothesis that N. I. H. may be created. That is the innovating group,
by its approach and treatment of the client group can set up the con-
ditions whereby the client group is forced to react negatively or resist
the innovation. If we examine the cases that had negative results we
should see these forces in each. In order to reinforce this view, an
examination of the positive cases where an innovation was accepted
should show that the client group was allowed and encouraged to react
positively. This hypothesis does not deny that there are groups and
individuals who are prone to reject innovations as a matter of policy
or who expend considerable effort to find flaws that will allow rejection.
Far from it! As a matter of fact, I feel technical people are generally
prone to be critical and pessimistic of innovations both because of
pride in their expertise which rejects new information not of their own
creation and as a matter of discipline that requires rigorous proof
of innovations before acceptance. No, this just makes the job of
creating change more difficult. It means that those who propose in-
novations to technical people must be aware, be sensitive to these
points of view in order to cope with them.
Negative Cases
Let us examine the failures among the cases to see if there
are any common flaws of procedure that might be spoken of as creating
N.I. H. In order to do this, we should look at the R forces listed for
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the failures, since these are the verbalized reasons given for rejection.
The cases that ended negatively, in which the innovation was not ac-
cepted, are: Case I, Plants 1 and 5; Case II and Case III. The first
R force type, I will call this force A, might be characterized as invasion
in an area of vested interest. Each of the negative cases (see list of
negative case R forces below) has a force relating to prior client work
in the area in which the Research Center has chosen to concentrate
some effort. Now this alone should not be a deterrent to research
investigation. Rather, it should tell those interested in introducing
a prospective innovation that at the time the investigation is started
the client should be brought in on the work. If not actually made part
of the effort, the client should at least be made a constant consultant.
An even more effective first step, where it can be managed, is to
have the client ask for help. During the initial phase of investigation,
if the client refuses to cooperate, shows no interest and resists the
investigation, the researchers should face the fact that the innovation
will likely not be accepted and used by that client regardless of the
technical "success" of the innovation. The counterpoint to the last
statement will be seen in the examination of the positive cases that
have clients with vested interests, all right, but in which the client
feels he has an unsolved problem where Research Center effort can
help.
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The second R force, called force B, seems to be lack of con-
sultation with the client. The client feels left out of the process as
if his thoughts and experience were of no consequence. Little wonder
that when it is the client's turn to control the situation they are less
receptive to the change. One point for the prospective innovator to
remember here is that in two cases the Research Center assumed
the client group had agreed to Center work in the particular area but
it turned out upper management on both sides had agreed, not the
engineers, who would ultimately institute the change. I would say,
therefore, that it is incumbent for innovators to be sure all levels
are aboard and not rely on client inter-level communication (which
may still not achieve engineer commitment). The "B" force is
probably at the nub of N.I.H. Coch and French, Zander and Moore9
all make the basic point that those who are to be changed must become
aware of and be made a part of the process of change. While I have
described some techniques, and will describe more, for "overcoming
N.I. H. ", the basic fact shown by these cases seems to be that receptivity
is created by making sure the client group early and often is made
aware of and becomes a part of the innovation process. That statement
says positively what R force "B" says negatively, that resistance is
created by excluding client participation.
9 Leo B. Moore, "Too Much Management Too Little Change,"
Harvard Business Review, XXXIV No. 1 (January-February 1956)
The "C" force in this trilogy of things not to do appears to be
technical, and possibly a "front" or scapegoat. Each failure case
generated some R force that had a physical, usually technical reason
why the innovation would not work at that plant. I suspect this is the
good old human ability to rationalize any emotion into an unemotional
"reason" for action or attitude. In a business, especially in a tech-
nical portion of a business, some "facts" must be found for actions
taken, in this case, rejection of an innovation. Various reasons for
rejection appeared in the cases, but I will label them all as surface,
or for the record, reasons not having much to do with the real
problems listed above.
Negative Case R Forces
Type A
Case I Plant 1 No. 1
Case II Plant 6 No. 1
Case III Plant 2 No. 2
Case I Plant 1 No. 2
Case II Plant 6 No. 2
Case III Plant 2 No. 5
Plant 1 engineers working
on own machine
Center working in area in
which Plant 6 responsible
Inventory plan of Plant 2
ignored
Resented "surprise" intrusion
of "outside" group
Center proposing to change
existing methods developed
by Plant 6 - no consultation
No participation in shop
selection for Center study
Type B
~
Negative Case R Forces
(continued)
Type C
Case I Plant 1 No. 3 Machine not adaptable to
peculiar problems of Plant I
Plant 5 No. 2 Maintenance of Center
machine a problem
Case II Plant 6 No. 4 No skilled repairmen
trained
Case III Plant 2 No. 1 Shop quality concerns
Positive Cases
If the negative cases were characterized by lack of client
identification and participation in the evolution of the innovation, then
hopefully the positive cases would show evidence of these character-
istics. For the point to be well proven, positive cases with the same
initial conditions of vested interest (force A) should show that an altered
approach to the client created the positive acceptance of the innovation.
Unfortunately, the Research Center acted consistently throughout the
study period and no such change in approach was observed. What then
distinguishes the positive cases from the negative, and does this dif-
ference reinforce the concept that N.I.H. is created? All the positive
cases had one thing in common: the client came to the Research Center
with a problem. As indicated in Case I Plant 2, asking for help is a
very significant way in which a client identifies with and will accept
I
change. It would seem this would be one of the best ways to introduce
an innovation, where possible. However, is this action (asking for
help) the same as, or can it be correlated with the proposed requirement
that positive cases must have client participation? I think it can
without a very large jump from one to the other. The positive cases
had the first step missing from the total approach required of the
Center approaching a neutral or hostile client. That is, the Center
would have to interest the client in the innovation development and
get him actively interested in becoming identified with the effort.
When the client comes to the Center saying, "I have a problem I think
you can help solve" the Center would have to be "talented" to turn off
interest. The way it could be turned off would be for the Center to
say they would study the problem and contact the client when a solution
was developed. Fortunately, in the cases studied, either the Center
did not do it or the client would not allow it. So I feel the positive
cases lend partial support and at least do not oppose the concept.
More will be said later about future investigation that might have
positive supporting results.
The Champion Versus The Inventor
I have already outlined the concept of the innovation "champion"
of Morison and Shon in the Case I Plant 2 discussion. A good measure
of the success of that project appeared to be because of the continued
-·
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faith and effort of a champion for the machine. A much more active
champion, whose role was team representative, appears in Case IV.
He became the focus and channel through which the innovating team
and the client communicated. By being sensitive to the needs of the
client - to participate, identify with the project, be kept informed and
not be bypassed - he achieved very complete acceptance of the innovation.
The ideal champion appears to be an entrepreneur type who identifies
or makes his own the innovation in question and is determined that it
will be accepted and succeed. At the same time our ideal must be
knowledgeable of the needs of the client, and so approach and work
with him that the client is able to become a part of the innovating
effort.
Shon also speaks of the problems created by a champion within
the innovating organization, both because an outsider may be the only
one capable of playing the champion role and the disruptions that an
over-enthusiastic champion could cause by keeping the organization
in constant turmoil. There is no question that it would be difficult to
recruit and interpose a champion on an innovating group. Yet the
technique is so valuable, effort should be expended in the attempt.
One possibility is for organizations to actively seek such skills among
its own members and openly develop the champion role. I suspect
those suited may not be at the top of the technical heap and may well
0
flower when given the ability to act as the innovating team repre-
sentative. A natural ability to get along with others, plus some tech-
nical understanding could be augmented by training in the work done
in the area of overcoming resistance to change. A model group in
which a champion is a part is probably the best way to introduce the
concept. I have no doubt that Case IV will be used in this way at the
Research Center. Here it will be noted the champion was a skillful
member of the team.
The Innovator Role
I am here talking about identifying the innovator in the client
group. There has been considerable research toward understanding
how new products or concepts are adopted among consumers by
marketing people. Two such studies that bear on this point are one
by Coleman, Menzel and Katzl0 and the other by the Foundation for
Research on Human Behavior. 11 The Coleman study deals with an
attempt to identify which doctors in a town were the first to adopt
the use of a new drug and how use spread to others. A certain group
of doctors were identified as innovators to whom others looked for
1 0 James Coleman, Herbert Menzel and Elihu Katz,
"Social Processes in Physicians' Adoption of a New Drug,"
Journal of Chronic Diseases, Vol. IX, No. 1 (January, 1959).
11 "The Adoption Process: Foundation for
Research on Human Behavior, " The Adoption of New Products:
Process and Influence (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Foundation for Research
on Human Behavior, 1959) pp. 1-8.
new ideas. The innovators were held in high esteem technically, were
successful and could afford to innovate and, in general, presented
themselves to new ideas through attending technical meetings, reading
journals and the like. The point of the study was that by identifying
the innovators, producers of a new drug could concentrate more effort
on convincing them of the efficacy of the drug in the hope that if
adopted by them a general adoption would follow. The second study
is similar on an entirely different group in which adoption of a new
hybrid corn is traced among innovating farmers. Traits similar to
the innovating doctors were found: technically looked up to, succesful
enough to experiment and an inclination to be sensitive to and look for
new ideas.
Allen and Cohen have proposed similar methods of innovation
introduction in their study in an R & D Laboratory. They call the
innovator leaders "technological gatekeepers" and characterize them
in three ways:
"a. They will be the people to whom others in the Lab most
frequently turn for technical advice and consultation.
b. They, themselves, will be more exposed (than others
in the Lab), to such formal media as the scientific and
technological literature.
c. In addition to exposure to formal media, the gatekeepers
will maintain a greater degree of informal contact with
members of the scientific /te chnological community
outside of their own Laboratory. " 12
1 2 Thomas J. Allen and Stephen I. Cohen, "Information Flow
in an R & D Laboratory" Working paper #217-66 of the Alfred P. Sloan
School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 1966
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resists change but is just the same as any other group who identifies
with the present state and resists a change upon the present way of
life. As I say, this point should surprise no one, but I feel it worth-
while to repeat in order to point out that a prospective innovating
group should approach the technical client with the same expectation
of resistance to change as if the client were, say, a shop group about
to have a new manufacturing method imposed on them.
Group Climate
My last observation is another in what might be called techniques
that an innovating group might keep in mind when considering how and
14
to whom an innovation will be introduced. R. P. Billerl4 ran a study
among R & D organizations in which, among other things, he sought
to identify those organizations most adaptive to change. Among the
many findings of the study: "There are direct relationships between
an organization perceived to be adaptive and the extent to which it is
both effective and able to initiate change internally when needed. "
This says to me that the innovating group should, where possible,
seek out and attempt to deal with those client groups noted (they may
14R. P. Biller, "Research on Change in Research and
Development Organizations" unpublished study conducted at the
U. S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California (1966).
have to search and pry, their own experience may be the best guide)
for adaptability. Too simple to make a point about? I am not so sure
that overt consideration is given to the place most likely to accept an
innovation as the place to start. Acceptance and use by a sister plant
is probably the best argument the Research Center can use in suggesting
adoption of an innovation to a plant. This is one method for inducing
plants (after the first plant has used the innovation) to ask for help.
Findings
The list of how to do it gained from this study goes something
like this:
1. Foster the situation in which the client asks for help.
2. Where possible, develop a champion or team repre-
sentative to act as go between with the client.
3. Contact the client at the time the innovation focuses
on use at a particular plant. Make the client a part
of the development, help him to identify with and
become a part of the work.
4. If the client continues active and strong resistance
at this point, expect no change after final development.
5. Be sensitive to past experiences, try to picture the
research organization as the client sees it and act
accordingly.
6. Attempt to identify adaptive groups and innovators
within groups and work with them first.
7. Expect resistance to change, and work to reduce the
resistance not increase the outside pressure to change.
3uggesciuns rul- r ui-Lrrer ~esearcn
The follow-on to the case studies listed here should be an
attempt to apply the findings with a new innovation to a client group
similar to those negative cases in which the innovations were not
accepted, since all innovations cannot be introduced in response to
a request, as the positive cases were. Only in this way can any
positive steps be taken along a route to understanding receptivity
to innovations and eliminating N. I. H. Perhaps there are cases now
where some or all of the listed techniques or other techniques of
introduction have been tried with success.
Introduction of technical innovations to technical gr oups is
at once the same as and different from introduction to non-technical
groups. Certainly most individuals react in similar ways to change
and to the extent that the technical group is resisting change the
general body of knowledge applies. However, the technical group
is different in that it is better able to resist change because of the
expertise in its possession. The technical group can counter scientific
proof with scientific disproof and is quite capable of dreaming up an
endless list of technical obstructions to change. This only make s
the job toughe r. It says that the innovator approaching a technical
group must be more understanding, more sensitive and moreopen
if he hopes to succeed.
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